The 2015 Amendments To The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure
**Initially Published in The Colorado Lawyer, February 2016 Issue, Vol. 45, No. 2, P. 23
New and important changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on December 1, 2015, and apply to all newly filed cases as well as currently pending cases “insofar as just and practicable”. 1 The changes affect Rules 1, 4, 16, 26, 33, 34, and 37, 55, and 84. They deal primarily with the scope of discovery, case management, and preservation of electronically stored information, or ESI. The amendments generally reflect an effort to refocus litigants’ ongoing obligation to conduct discovery efficiently and in appropriate proportion to the needs of the case at issue. The redline version of the 2015 amendments, with committee notes, is available for download at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18481/download. I. Rule 1 Rule 1 previously was a rule of construction that required the courts to administer the Federal Rules to ensure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of civil actions. 2 The wording placed responsibility on the courts. New Rule 1 expressly requires the courts and the parties to construe, administer and employ the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to achieve these goals. 3 II. Rule 4 Rule 4 has changed to provide a mandatory form to be used for requesting waiver of service. Prior Rule 4 contained an example waiver form but permitted other formats as long as they followed the rule’s substantive requirements. The waiver of service form provided with New Rule 4 is now mandatory. The Rule 4 form can be downloaded at http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Forms/CivilForms/notice-n-waiver-of-serv-summons.pdf. III. Rule 16 The amendments to Rule 16 are designed to encourage speedier scheduling and greater court involvement in ensuring the preservation of ESI. New Rule 16(b)(1)(B) does away with the provision allowing communication by “telephone, mail, or other means” to substitute a Rule 16(b) scheduling conference. The parties and the court must engage in direct simultaneous communication, either in person, by telephone, or other means. 4 New Rule 16 shortens the deadline for the court to issue its scheduling order. While the deadline was 120 days under Prior Rule 16, New Rule 16 requires the court to issue the court scheduling order within 90 days after service of the complaint or 60 days after the appearance of any defendant. The court may extend this deadline upon a finding of good cause. Prior Rule 16(b)(3)(B) included a list of items for consideration in entering the court scheduling order. New Rule 16(b)(3)(B) adds to this list, providing that the court may also include protocols for preservation of ESI. This change is apropos considering the changes to Rule 37 governing sanctions for failure to preserve ESI, discussed below. The new rule also permits the court to add agreed protocols for dealing with the disclosure of privileged information under F.R.E. 502, and to require the parties to request a conference before the court before filing discovery motions. In light of these new items, Rule 26(f)(3) has also been changed to require the parties to address these issues at their rule 26(f) conference. IV. Rule 26 The changes to Rule 26(b)(1), which governs the scope of discovery, have generated considerable controversy and debate. The amended rule introduces two main changes. First, it does away with the “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” language while clarifying the definition of “relevant information” in relation to the proper scope of discovery. 5 Second, the amended rule emphasizes that discovery must be “proportional” to the needs of the case, introducing a six-factor test by which the courts must determine proportionality. 6 a. Re-Defining “Relevance” The “relevance” standard under New Rule 26(b)(1) is narrower and more streamlined than in the prior rule. While Prior Rule 26(b)(1) allowed for discovery relevant to any claim or defense, 7 it also allowed for discovery of “any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action” upon a showing of good cause. It provided that “relevant” information need not be admissible “if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” 8 New Rule 26(b)(1) is more restrictive. It does away with the “relevant to the subject matter” and “reasonably calculated” standards. The new rule requires that discovery be “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Discovery fitting this relevance criterion “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” 9 The elimination of the “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” language is technically less substantive than it may seem. The Committee Notes point out that the wording of Prior Rule 26(b)(1) has caused practitioners to cite the “reasonably calculated” language as the general standard for the scope of discovery instead of the true “relevance” standard. 10 The Committee Notes emphasize that the appropriate scope is “relevance” to claims and defenses, and New Rule 26(b)(1) removes the “reasonably calculated” language to prevent further confusion. 11 New Rule 26(b)(1) also no longer permits discovery that is merely “relevant to the subject matter involved in the action,” even on a showing of good cause. 12 Discovery under the new rule must be “relevant to a party’s claims or defenses,” but what does that mean in practice? The Committee Notes cite illustrative examples including “other incidents of the same type, or involving the same product;” “information about organizational arrangements or filing systems;” and “information that could be used to impeach a likely witness.” 13 The Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure first introduced these examples in the Committee Notes to the 2000 amendments to Rule 26. The Committee Notes to the 2000 amendment acknowledge that a bright-line rule distinguishing “relevance to claims and defenses” from “relevance to subject matter” is not practical given the case-specific nature of the criteria. 14 New Rule 26(b)(1) also no longer expressly describes the scope of discovery as including “the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.” 15 This change is cosmetic. As the Advisory Committee explains, “[d]iscovery of such matters is so deeply entrenched in practice that it is no longer necessary to clutter the long text of Rule 26 with these examples.” 16 The above changes re-focus the scope of discovery on relevance to claims and defenses. These changes make the courts more likely to sustain objections to discovery of subject matter that is not in itself “relevant” to the parties’ claims and defenses as expressed in the pleadings. b. The Six-Factor “Proportionality” Test Possibly the flagship feature of the 2015 amendments to Rule 26, New Rule 26(b)(1) requires that, in addition to being relevant, discovery be “proportional to the needs of the case.” The New Rule also sets out six factors that guide the determination of “proportionality”: Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Many public commentators have expressed both optimism and concern about the “new” requirements that the proportionality test would impose on litigants and the courts. Opponents argued that a formal proportionality test would make discovery more difficult by imposing a new layer of motions practice over “proportionality” in every case. As one commentator wrote: I strongly oppose the amendment to Rule 26(b) injecting a proportionality test into the Rules. Under the current Rules, many of my adversaries routinely include boilerplate objections in to their responses to virtually every discovery request that I send. If this proposed change is adopted, I am confident that those boilerplate objections will be joined by an objection that the discovery requests are not proportional to the needs of the case. This, in turn, will generate unnecessary litigation over proportionality every time that a new discovery request is served. 17 Other commentators expressed optimism about the changes. As one supporter wrote: This change would provide a significant improvement compared to the overbroad scope of discovery defined by current Rule 26(b)(1) by reducing the costs and burdens in discovery practice. In addition, I support moving the proportionality language presently found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to 26(b)(1). This modification would remind parties that the principle of proportionality applies to all discovery and would encourage parties and judges to focus on what discovery should mean to each individual case.. 18 In addressing these and other comments, the Advisory Committee emphasized that Rule 26 already includes most of the above “proportionality” requirements. 19 Indeed, the only new factor is “the parties’ relative access to relevant information.” Other proportionality factors found in the old version of 26(b)(2)(C) include (1) analysis of the burden imposed by the discovery versus its likely benefit; (2) the importance of the issues at stake; (3) the amount in controversy (4) the resources of the parties, and (5) the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. In other words, the “proportionality” test does not introduce an altogether “new” standard so much as it re-emphasizes and re-prioritizes existing standards. The amended criteria are designed to refocus norms of discovery practice by giving existing proportionality requirements more conspicuous treatment in the rules. The proportionality test found in New Rule 26(b)(1) borrows much of its language from Prior Rule 26(b)(2)(C), which allowed the courts to limit discovery upon a determination that “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Prior Rule 26(b)(1) subjected the scope of discovery to the “limitations imposed by 26(b)(2)(C)” but only incorporated the limiting language by reference. The new rule expressly imports this language from Prior Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and places it “front and center” in Rule 26(b)(1). The Committee Notes describe the above changes as a re-emphasis of current standards, stating: The present amendment restores the proportionality factors to their original place in defining the scope of discovery. This change reinforces the Rule 26(g) obligation of the parties to consider these factors in making discovery requests, responses, or objections. Restoring the proportionality calculation to Rule 26(b)(1) does not change the existing responsibilities of the court and the parties to consider proportionality, and the change does not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all proportionality considerations. 20 i. Something Old, Something New For better or for worse, commentators generally agree that, by putting the question of proportionality front and center, disputes over proportionality will likely increase motions practice as the new rule takes effect. The Tenth Circuit did not require courts to make formal findings applying the proportionality factors as they existed under the old rules. 21 Courts and litigants generally did not systematically apply these factors in discovery or related motions practice. As the District of Maryland observed: Despite the obvious utility of the [prior] Rule 26(b)(2) factors in tailoring discovery to accommodate fair disclosure without imposing undue burden or expense, they have tended largely to be ignored by litigants, and, less frequently than desirable, used by the courts, sua sponte, to manage discovery. Instead, particularly with respect to disputes involving Rule 33 and Rule 34 discovery, the focus of the litigants tends to be the party seeking discovery’s perceived “right” to all information relating to the broad “subject matter” of the litigation, without any reflection as to the real usefulness of the information sought, or the burden or expense required to produce it, countered by the party resisting the discovery’s unparticularized claims of burden, expense, irrelevance, and privilege. 22 It is therefore important to consider how courts might formally apply the six criteria as a group in the context of determining whether challenged discovery meets the proportionality requirement of the new rule.. ii. Factor One: Importance of the Issues at Stake The Rules Committee deliberately chose “the importance of the issues” as the first of the six factors, placing it before even “the amount in controversy.” The Committee made this decision to emphasize that the amount in controversy does not trump issues of substantive justice. 23 What constitutes an “important issue,” however, remains open to question. The Advisory Committee cites the earlier 1983 Committee Note, which discussed this concept in terms of “vitally important personal or public values,” stating: The 1983 Committee Note recognized “the significance of the substantive issues, as measured in philosophic, social, or institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public policy spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.” Many other substantive areas also may involve litigation that seeks relatively small amounts of money, or no money at all, but that seeks to vindicate vitally important personal or public values. 24 The placement of “importance of the issues” before “amount in controversy” was also in response to comments strongly objecting to a prior version of the amendment which placed “amount in controversy” first. As one attorney warned, “[f]ew of our cases are likely to garner in excess of six figures, so putting ‘the amount in controversy,’ before ‘the importance of the issues at stake,’ spells the death knell for employment litigation. 25 Other comments questioned the wisdom of requiring judges to evaluate the “importance” of some cases over others. As one commentator noted: One judge will assess the “importance of the issues at stake” vastly differently from another or perhaps even differently than the judge himself might on another day (for reasons initially described in Judge Jerome Frank’s “Courts on Trial,” but that are becoming more well-documented through studies of decision-making based on “implicit biases” or “blind spots”). Judges – like all humans – are likely to value issues with which they have experience over issues with which they have little or no experience. Justice Thurgood Marshall presumably would place greater value on civil rights issues based on his legal background; Justice Tom Clark, who he replaced, presumably would place greater value on national security issues and corporate fraud or antitrust issues based on his experiences… 26 Nonetheless, New Rule 26(b)(1) provides potential ammunition for those seeking discovery in cases implicating important policy questions even if the amount in controversy is relatively small. On the other hand, the “importance of the issues” criterion could pose an obstacle in cases involving small amounts in controversy, high discovery costs, and garden-variety legal issues. iii. Factor Two: The Amount in Controversy This criteria is relatively straightforward, though not uncontroversial. Cases involving low amounts in controversy implicitly mandate a more streamlined approach to discovery, lest the parties spend more than the case’s monetary value on costly discovery issues. Consideration of the amount and controversy invites analysis of the costs of the proposed discovery. An amount in controversy $20,000 would theoretically weigh against allowing a discovery request that would cost $20,000 to comply with. On the other hand, what if the discovery costs are high because the responding party’s records are disorganized or difficult to search? One may expect courts to tackle this problem by assessing whether the responding party’s asserted costs are reasonable under the circumstances. However, with information storage and retrieval technology rapidly changing even from year to year, it would be difficult for the courts to develop objective metrics that would keep pace with changing technology. iv. Factor Three: Parties’ Relative Access to Relevant Information As the “new factor” in the equation, the Advisory Committee Notes describe “Relative Access” as an attempt to address the problem of “information asymmetry.” As the Committee Notes point out: One party – often an individual plaintiff – may have very little discoverable information. The other party may have vast amounts of information, including information that can be readily retrieved and information that is more difficult to retrieve. In practice these circumstances often mean that the burden of responding to discovery lies heavier on the party who has more information, and properly so.” This factor therefore deals with whether the party seeking discovery has reasonable access to the information requested by other means. Even if the requesting party technically has other means of access, this factor may still favor discovery if the producing party can produce the requested information quickly and easily. v. Factor Four: The Parties’ Resources While New Rule 26(b)(1) requires consideration of the parties’ resources, the Advisory Committee has cautioned against an overuse of this factor in limiting or allowing discovery. Citing prior Committee Notes on the subject, the Committee Notes state: [C]onsideration of the parties’ resources does not foreclose discovery requests addressed to an impecunious party, nor justify unlimited discovery requests addressed to a wealthy party. The 1983 Committee Note cautioned that “[t]he court must apply the standards in an even-handed manner that will prevent use of discovery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a party, whether financially weak or affluent.” 27 Where the parties’ resources are a factor, a protective order under New Rule 26(c)(1)(B) can also shift the costs of producing the discovery in appropriate cases. vi. Factor Five: The Importance of the Discovery in Resolving the Issues The “importance” factor requires assessment of the degree to which the discovery is necessary to prove a claim or defense. Courts analyzing this factor may consider the discovery’s relevance to a claim or defense as well as whether the issues implicated are central to the case. 28 vii. Factor Six: Whether the Burden or Expense of the Proposed Discovery Outweighs its Likely Benefit While much case law currently addresses the cost-benefit analysis of discovery, the Committee Notes also point out that this analysis should consider the ever-evolving capability of electronic search methods, stating: The burden or expense of proposed discovery should be determined in a realistic way. This includes the burden or expense of producing electronically stored information. Computer-based methods of searching such information continue to develop, particularly for cases involving large volumes of electronically stored information. Courts and parties should be willing to consider the opportunities for reducing the burden or expense of discovery as reliable means of searching electronically stored information become available. 29 These comments make clear that the relevance of today’s arguments about burden and expense may change significantly as new means of search and retrieval of ESI become commonplace. This factor is also controversial. While it may limit unnecessarily burdensome discovery, commentators have expressed concern that “burdensomeness” arguments provide opportunities for gamesmanship. Comments submitted by the American Association for Justice cautioned that “this factor upends the incentives for defendants to preserve documents in an easily accessible format and encourages them to ensure that discovery will be too expensive or difficult to retrieve.” 30 On the other hand, the courts have been and remain equipped to compel important discovery if it finds a party’s alleged “burden” in producing the discovery appears to be self-inflicted. 31 viii. Other Considerations Regarding the Proportionality Test Some public commentators have expressed concern that the “proportionality” test will burden the party seeking discovery with demonstrating proportionality. 32 The Committee Notes imply a shared burden to demonstrate (or refute) proportionality, pointing out that the proportionality test “does not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all proportionality considerations,” and is not intended to “permit the opposing party to refuse discovery simply by making a boilerplate objection that it is not proportional. The parties and the court have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes.” While courts have not yet interpreted the “shared” burden to demonstrate proportionality, existing case law suggests that each party will be required to present facts within their possession in objecting to or compelling discovery. As the District of Colorado has observed: When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevancy by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the scope of relevance as defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure…However, when a request for discovery is overly broad on its face or when relevancy is not readily apparent, the party seeking the discovery has the burden to show the relevancy of the request. 33 ix. Shifting the Cost of Discovery Rule 26(c)(1)(B) has also been amended to recognize expressly the court’s authority to allocate discovery costs as part of a protective order. Such orders may be especially useful in cases where the parties cannot agree on proportionality. Depending on the circumstances, a party may seek a cost-shifting protective order as a way to resolve controversies over the burdensomeness of particular requests. x. Early Discovery Requests and Discovery Sequencing New Rule 26(d)(2) allows parties to deliver Rule 34 production requests ahead of the Rule 26(f) conference. Under new rule, responses not considered served until the 26(f) conference occurs. Responses are due within 30 days (not 33) 34 after the conference. The new rule allows the parties to stipulate or move the court for longer deadlines. Finally, New Rule 26(d)(2) allows the parties to stipulate as to the sequence of discovery without requiring a motion or court order. V. Changes to Rules 30, 31, and 33 Rule 30 and 31, which govern depositions, have been amended to account for the changes to Rule 26. Both rules require that where the parties seek leave of court to conduct depositions, “the court must grant leave to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(1) and (2).” Rule 33, governing interrogatories, has also been amended to reflect the proportionality requirements of Rule 26(b). VI. Rule 34 Like Rules 30, 31, and 33, the amendments to Rule 34 (governing requests for production) incorporate the changes to Rule 26. They also require greater specificity in objecting to discovery requests. New Rule 34(b)(2)(B) requires the responding party to “state an objection with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” New Rule 34(b)(2)(C) further clarifies this requirement by requiring that “an objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” In practical terms, however, a party will not necessarily have detailed knowledge of withheld documents. This is especially so if a responding party has conducted a limited search for documents based on an objection: how can the party specify what has been “withheld” in these circumstances? The Committee Notes address these questions, providing that in objecting to a request, “[t]he producing party does not need to provide a detailed description or log of all documents withheld, but does need to alert other parties to the fact that documents have been withheld and thereby facilitate an informed discussion of the objection.” The Committee Notes also address the issue of limited searches, providing that “an objection that states the limits that have controlled the search for responsive and relevant materials qualifies as a statement that the materials have been ‘withheld.'” 35 Finally, Rule 34(b)(2)(B) has been amended to reflect the “common practice” of producing documents rather than permitting inspection. 36 The new rule provides that “[t]he responding party may state that it will produce copies of documents or of electronically stored information instead of permitting inspection. The production must then be completed no later than the time for inspection specified in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response.” 37 VII. Rule 37 The amendments to Rule 37(e) provide more guidance regarding the failure to preserve ESI. Prior Rule 37(e), adopted in 2006, provided that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.” While the rule implied authority to impose sanctions on a finding of bad faith, it provided no other specific criteria. New Rule 37(e) provides a more comprehensive framework for courts to issue sanctions in the event of loss of ESI where a) a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it,” and b) “it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery.” As a preliminary matter, while New Rule 37(e)(1) requires a finding of prejudice resulting from a negligent failure to preserve ESI, it does not does not place a burden of proving or disproving prejudice on one party or the other.. The Committee Notes indicate that under certain circumstances, it would be unfair for the party that did not lose the information to demonstrate prejudice. Under other circumstances, however, the content of the lost information might be “fairly evident” and perhaps unimportant in light of other available information. The Committee Notes suggest that the party seeking relief should be required to demonstrate prejudice under those circumstances. 38 In light of these considerations, the rule leaves the court with discretion as to how best to assess prejudice. 39 Once prejudice has been found, the court “may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.” The court is afforded wide discretion in fashioning appropriate remedies, depending on the circumstances. The Committee Notes caution, however, that “authority to order measures no greater than necessary to cure prejudice does not require the court to adopt measures to cure every possible prejudicial effect.” 40 No finding of prejudice is required, however, to impose sanctions where a party has acted “with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation.” 41 Sanctions for the willfull destruction of ESI include (1) presumptions that the lost information was unfavorable; (2) adverse jury instructions; or (3) dismissal of the action or default judgment. 42 The Committee Notes caution that these more punitive remedies should not be confused with the “curative” remedies available under Rule 26(e)(1), cautioning that courts should: [E]nsure that curative measures under subdivision (e)(1) do not have the effect of measures that are permitted under subdivision (e)(2) only on a finding of intent to deprive another party of the lost information’s use in the litigation. An example of an inappropriate (e)(1) measure might be an order striking pleadings related to, or precluding a party from offering any evidence in support of, the central or only claim or defense in the case. On the other hand, it may be appropriate to exclude a specific item of evidence to offset prejudice caused by failure to preserve other evidence that might contradict the excluded item of evidence. 43 Lastly, and while not incorporated into Rule 37(e) itself, the Committee Notes provide considerable analysis as to how courts should determine whether a party has taken reasonable steps to preserve ESI. The Committee Notes describe factors to address in considering when a duty to preserve may have arisen, as well as proportionality factors in evaluating what preservation measures may have been reasonable. 44 They also emphasize that Rule 37(e) does not apply where a party loses information despite reasonable preservation efforts. 45 Finally, the Committee Notes explore the distinction between independent common law or statutory duties to preserve information and the obligations triggered under New Rule 37(e). 46 Litigants attempting to evaluate the sufficiency of preservation efforts should reference these notes in addition to the existing case law. VIII. Rules 55 and 84 Rule 55, governing default judgments, has also been amended to clarify the difference between entry of default and entry of a final judgment. An entry of default that does not dispose of all issues in the case may be set aside for good cause under New Rule 55. If, on the other hand, an entry of default results in a final judgment under Rule 54, such a judgment can be set aside only under the standards of Rule 60. Finally, Rule 84 has been amended to abrogate the appendix of forms. IX. Conclusion The 2015 Amendments to the federal rules may very well reinvigorate many preexisting standards for the conduct of discovery in federal courts. While many contend that the amendments to Rule 26 will spawn considerable motions practice, others argue that the amendments will ultimately help streamline the discovery process. Other developments, such as the new framework for sanctions under Rule 37(e), will provide the court with additional tools to deal appropriately with failure to preserve ESI.
1 See April 29, 2015 J. Roberts order adopting amendments subject to congressional approval, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/congress-materials, P. 14 (“the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 2015, and shall govern in all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.”) 2 See Prior Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. The prior rule required that the federal rules “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” 3 New Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 4 Committee Notes to 2015 Amendments, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18481/download (“2015 Committee Notes”) at p. 7. 5 See New Rule 26(b)(1). 6 Id. 7 Prior Rule 26(b)(1). 8 See id. 9 See New Rule 26(b)(1). 10 2015 Committee Notes at 24. 11 Id. 12 See New Rule 26(b)(1). 13 2015 Committee Notes at 23. 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, at Committee Notes to 2000 Amendment. The 2000 Committee Notes emphasize that “[t]he dividing line between information relevant to the claims and defenses and that relevant only to the subject matter of the action cannot be defined with precision,” and caution that the relevance of particular information to the case “depends on the circumstances of the pending action.” 15 New Rule 26(b)(1). 16 2015 Committee Notes at 23. 17 Comment from Allan Karlin, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-2171 18 Comment from Gregory Grisham, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-2218 19 See 2015 Committee Notes at p. 19. 20 Id. 21 In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) does not require a formalistic and detailed balancing of the factors listed therein.) 22 Thompson v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 199 F.R.D. 168, 171 (D. Md. 2001). 23 2015 Committee Notes at 17. 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 at 1983 Amendment Committee Notes. 25 Comment from Suzanne Tongring, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-1908 26 Comment from J. Byran Wood, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-2112 27 2015 Committee Notes at 22. 28 See e.g. In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, 301 F.R.D. 449, 455 (N.D.Cal., 2014.) 29 2015 Committee Notes at 22. 30 Comment from American Association for Justice, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-2046 31 See e.g. Foster v. Logan’s Roadhouse, Inc., 2013 WL 1498958, at *4 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“Even so, plaintiff should not be prevented from obtaining necessary discovery simply because defendant has chosen to maintain its records in a manner that makes searches difficult and time-consuming. Overall, the importance of the discovery to plaintiff outweighs defendant’s burden in producing it.”) 32 See e.g. Comment from John Vail, Center for Constitutional Litigation, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-0199 (“Instead of a requesting party being entitled to information unless the opposing party shows disproportionality, a requesting party now would be entitled to information only upon affirmatively demonstrating proportionality.”) 33 Bonanno v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., LLC, 255 F.R.D. 550, 552 (D.Colo. 2009). 34 Because New Rule 16 deems the Rule 26(f) conference to constitute “service” of a previously delivered Rule 34 request, the “service” was not accomplished by the prior delivery of the requests. As such, delivery of a Rule 34 Discovery Request by electronic means prior to the Rule 26(f) conference should not trigger the time extending provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) that would apply if the requests were electronically served after the Rule 26(f) conference. 35 2015 Committee Notes at 34. 36 Id. at 38. 37 New Rule 34(b)(2)(B). 38 Id. at 43, 47. 39 Id. 40 Id. at 44. 41 New Rule 37(e)(2). 42 New Rule 37(e)(2)(A), (B), and (C). 43 2015 Committee Notes at 44. 44 Id. at 39-41. 45 Id. at 41. 46 Id. at 40. (“The fact that a party had an independent obligation to preserve information does not necessarily mean that it had such a duty with respect to the litigation, and the fact that the party failed to observe some other preservation obligation does not itself prove that its efforts to preserve were not reasonable with respect to a particular case.”)