Federal copyright law allows an author (or their statutory successor) to terminate the author's “grant” (i.e., assignment) of a copyright to another party. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). This termination right “allows an author [or his successor] to undo a prior transfer of his copyright and recapture all interests in the copyright for himself.” Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, Inc., 822 F.3d 926, 928 (6th Cir. 2016). If the author transferred his copyright to a third party in 1978 or later, they (or thier successor) can terminate the transfer between 35 and 40 years after the copyright was assigned. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). Exercising that right requires the author (or successor) to send a termination notice to the grantee and file the notice with the U.S. Copyright Office. Id. § 203(a)(4). Termination notices, for example, must “state the effective date of the [grant's] termination” (a date prescribed by law), and they must “comply” “in form” and “content” with “requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation.” 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4)(A)-(B). “Upon the effective date of termination,” the statute explains, “all rights” under federal copyright law “that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the . . . persons owning termination interests.” Id. § 203(b). 

In Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., No. 24-5263, __ F.4th __ (6th Cir. July 7, 2025), heirs squabbled over copyright assignments and associated royalties to the song “Que Sera, Sera.” 

Travilyn and Tammy Livingston (mother and daughter) each claim a right to royalties tied to certain songs, including “Que Sera, Sera,” authored by Jay Livingston (Travilyn's father and Tammy's grandfather). Between 1984 and 2000, Jay assigned his copyright interests in several songs to a music publishing company, Jay Livingston Music, which then paid royalties to a Family Trust that benefited Travilyn, Tammy, and other members of the Livingston family. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).

After Jay and his wife deceased, Travilyn, as Jay's only child, possessed Jay's termination right. Id. § 203(a)(2)(B) (explaining that an “author's surviving children” “own the author's entire termination interest” if there is no “widow”). In May 2015, Travilyn invoked her statutory right to “terminat[e]” those copyright grants. Id. § 203(a). Travilyn filed termination notices with the United States Copyright Office, seeking to undo her father's assignments to the company and recapture his interests in the copyrights for herself. The termination notice stated that the grant's “effective date of termination” was July 15, 2019, with all rights under the “Que Sera, Sera” copyright then immediately reverting to Travilyn. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). 

Travilyn's daughter Tammy, a beneficiary of her grandfather's assignments, sued her mother, challenging the terminations. 

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Tammy's lawsuit because "Tammy has not plausibly alleged that Travilyn's termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid." 

On August 28, 1985, Jay and his wife had established the Family Trust, transferring to it “all right, title and interest” in “their assets, whether real or personal” which included Jay's right to receive royalties (and, as beneficiaries of the Family Trust, Travilyn, Tammy, and other members of the Livingston family received a percentage of these royalties). Tammy also alleged in her complaint that Jay previously assigned his copyrights to Jay Livingston Music, and that the Family Trust held Jay's reversionary interest in each of the copyrights he assigned to Jay Livingston Music. If so, then in 2011, Jay's interests in the underlying copyrights, including for “Que Sera, Sera,” allegedly would revert to the Family Trust pursuant to the terms of those assigment agreements. 

A May 2000 Agreement that Jay signed as an individual, however, had extended the term by which Jay Livingston Music, Inc. would own Jay's copyright interests. Tammy argued that the May 2000 Agreement failed to validly extend those agreements because Jay signed the agreement as an “individual”; and only Jay as a “trustee” could have extended the agreements, given that the Family Trust held Jay's reversionary interest in the copyrights at that time. If so, then Jay's interests in the underlying copyrights reverted to the Family Trust in 2011, and Travilyn no longer had any copyright grants to terminate in May 2015 because the Family Trust instead owned the copyright interests underlying those grants. 

After Jay died on October 17, 2001, however, the California probate court held that the Family Trust held “no copyright interests” and that and all such interests ever owned by Jay were now owned by Jay Livingston Music.

The Sixth Circuit held that Tammy was bound by the California probate court's prior decision, which was a final judgment on the merits, that the copyrights, including for “Que Sera, Sera,” were owned by Jay Livingston Music, because of claim preclusion. Therefore, Travilyn could terminate those prior copyright assignments to Jay Livingston Music. 

In the alternative, Tammy argued that § 203(a) of the Copyright Act authorizes an author (or his statutory successor) to terminate an author's copyright grant if, but only if, the grant had been “executed by the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). According to Tammy, because Jay signed the May 2000 Agreement as a “trustee,” he never “executed” any copyright “grant” as an “author,” rendering the termination notices Travilyn filed ineffective.

The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument by noting that Jay had signed the May 2000 Agreement as an individual (even though this seems inconsistent with the California probate court's decision, that was binding under claim preclusion which deals with questions of law; whereas issue preclusion or collateral estoppel can apply to issues of law or fact).