The sixth DuPont factor allows an Applicant to contract the scope of protection  of a cited trademark registration by adducing evidence of the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods or services. Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 251, at *24 (citation omitted). A determination of the strength or weakness of the cited mark helps inform its scope of protection. See In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., No. 86338392, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 448, at *17-18 (“[T]he strength of the cited mark is—as always—relevant to assessing the likelihood of confusion under the du Pont framework.”). 

When evaluating the strength or weakness of a mark, one looks at the mark's inherent conceptual strength based on the nature of the term itself and its commercial strength in the marketplace. See Spireon, Inc. v. Flex LTD, 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“There are two prongs of analysis for a mark's strength under the sixth factor: conceptual strength and commercial strength.”); In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (measuring both conceptual and marketplace strength); Made in Nature, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 251, at *24 (discussing strength).

Conceptual strength is a measure of a trademark's inherent distinctiveness. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (a “descriptive component of a mark may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion.”) (quoting In re Nat'l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 

“Third party registrations are relevant to prove that some segment of the composite marks which both contesting parties use has a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that segment is relatively weak.” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Even if “there is no evidence of actual use” of “third-party registrations,” such registrations “may be given some weight to show the meaning of a mark in the same way that dictionaries are used.” Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 917 (CCPA 1976). 

But a trademark registration is not evidence that the registered mark is in use on a commercial scale, and thus has little probative value as evidence of  commercial weakness or market weakness which would depend on their actual usage in the market. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Morinaga, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 448, at *22-23 (“But Applicant's citation of third-party registrations as evidence of market weakness is unavailing because third-party registrations standing alone, are not evidence that the registered marks are in use on a commercial scale, let alone that consumers have become so accustomed to seeing them in the marketplace that they have learned to distinguish among them by minor differences.”).

The TTAB recently held that "there is some evidence to show that RIPPED is somewhat suggestive in the broad physical fitness industry, but insufficient evidence to demonstrate commercial weakness even as to that broad sector." In re Ripped Franchise, LLC, Ser. No. 98369548 (TTAB Aug. 10, 2026).

Even a suggestive mark is inherently distinctive and entitled to a normal scope of protection. See Dollar Fin. Grp. v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“[T]he fact that a mark may be somewhat suggestive does not mean that it is a ‘weak' mark entitled to a limited scope of protection.”) (quoting In re Great Lakes Canning, No. 73365360, 1985 TTAB LEXIS 75, at *7). And even if one were to find a highly suggestive mark as being relatively weak, it would still be entitled to protection against the registration by a subsequent user of an identical or near identical mark for identical services. See China Healthways Inst., Inc. v. Wang, 491 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

     [O]ther RIPPED-formative marks could indicate the possibility of co-existence should the marks have at least “minimal differences” between them. See Plus Prods. v. Natural Organics, Inc., 1979 TTAB LEXIS 85, at *21 (no number in original) (“A third inference is that a number of different owners of trademarks have believed, over a long interval of time, that various ‘PLUS' marks can be used and registered side by side without causing confusion or mistake provided there are minimal differences between the marks.”), cited in Couch/Braunsdorf Affinity, Inc. v. 12 Interactive, LLC, No. 92051006, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 95, at *58, *60 (“It is clear from the third-party registrations that any addition to the word ‘Perks' has been sufficient for the Patent and Trademark Office to view these marks as being sufficiently different from petitioner's registered marks, and from each other, such as not to cause confusion.”). 

Here, the TTAB noted that "the other registered third-party marks each have
distinguishing elements – other terms and designs – whereas Applicant's mark is solely RIPPED with a minimal design"; accorded the GET RIPPED mark the normal scope of protection due an inherently distinctive mark; and found the sixth DuPont factor to be "neutral." Ultimately finding that "[n]o factors weigh against likelihood of confusion," the TTAB affirmed a Section 2(d) refusal.