“As a general rule, trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark even though the sale is not authorized by the mark owner.” Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Polymer Tech. I”) (footnote omitted), as amended (Nov. 25, 1992); see also Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (Holmes, J.) (“[A trademark] does not confer a right to prohibit the use of the word or words. It is not a copyright. . . . A trade[]mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good[]will against the sale of another's product as his [own].”). “Thus, a distributor who resells trademarked goods without change is not liable for trademark infringement.” Polymer Tech. I, 975 F.2d at 62. And that is true whether or not the distributor came to possess the goods legitimately. See ML Fashion, LLC v. Nobelle GW, LLC, 2022 WL 313965, at *16-18 (D. Conn. Feb. 2, 2022).

In Tentantable.com, LLC v. Aljibouri, 2025 WL 959656, No. 22-CV-78-LJV (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025), before leaving his employment, an employee allegedly stole products from the plaintiffs to start his own company, and sold the stolen merchandise. The now-former employee was a “warehouse supervisor” who had been “entering orders” and “making deliveries” of the plaintiffs' goods for which the plaintiff had no record and had not been paid; as well as stealing property from the plaintiffs' warehouse. The complaint alleged that, in conspiring to steal plaintiff's products and resell them for their own profit, the defendants were selling products that the defendants have no right to sell. 

But the court held that “the mere fact that the defendants sold the plaintiffs' goods with the plaintiffs' trademarks without their permission is not enough to state a Lanham Act claim.” 

The court noted that courts have rejected Lanham Act claims based on similar allegations. For example, in Burton v. Label, LLC, 344 F. Supp. 3d 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), a former employee allegedly had “use[d] his position as a Label salesman to sell items represented to be Label goods by placing orders with Label suppliers” and then keeping the profits for himself. Id. at 701. The court found that the alleged conduct was not actionable under the Lanham Act because the former employee “was simply unlawfully pocketing proceeds that belonged to his employer; he was not falsely representing the origin of his own goods.” Id.; see also Hidalgo Corp. v. J. Kugel Designs, Inc., No. 05-20476-CIV, 2006 WL 8433271, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006) (“Any disputes relating to the ‘legitimacy' of first sales are likely left to other areas of law for resolution, and not trademark law.”). 

Similarly, in ML Fashion, the plaintiff, a clothing company, asserted Lanham Act claims based on allegations that the defendant, another clothing company, had “stole[n the plaintiff's] goods and started selling them.” Id., 2022 WL 313965, at *16. The plaintiff did “not allege that [the defendant had] altered the merchandise in any way.” Id. Rather, its false advertising claim was based on “the fact that [the defendant wa]s selling products that [we]re not [its] to sell and, in the case of [certain] items, products [that] it d[id] not have the authority to sell,” and the plaintiff argued this constituted a “false statement [by] implication.” Id. The court held that that “the mere selling of the products does not make any statement, let alone the statement [the p]laintiffs seek to . . . imply—namely, that the goods [the defendant] sells belong to [the defendant].” Id. at *15-17. And the court likewise rejected the plaintiff's claim under the Lanham Act for unfair competition. See id. at *17-18. Such a claim did not lie, the court explained, because the complaint focused “entirely on disputed ownership of the goods being sold [and was] devoid of any [allegations that the defendant made] any affirmative false representation or . . . altered [the products sold] in any way.” Id. at *18. 

The plaintiffs' trademark infringement and false designation of origin claims boil down to claims that the defendants violated the Lanham Act simply by selling stolen goods.... And that is simply not sufficient. Indeed, as this Court pointed out at oral argument, if the allegations here were enough to state a claim under the Lanham Act, then it would seem that any distributor—say, Target—that sells genuine goods under their trademarked names could be liable under the Lanham Act should there be a dispute about ownership. Cf. Champion Spark Plug Co., 331 U.S. at 129 (“[W]e would not suppose that one could be enjoined [under the Lanham Act] from selling a car whose valves had been reground and whose piston rings had been replaced unless he removed the name Ford or Chevrolet.”).

     In sum, while the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the sale of stolen property might well state a claim for conversion or some other tort, such claims, without more, do not fall within the Lanham Act's purview. The plaintiffs' claims for trademark infringement and false designation of origin therefore are dismissed. 

The court further held that without specific allegations suggesting that any defendant altered the goods, misrepresented them, or otherwise caused “consumer confusion”; the plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Lanham Act.