In trade-secret cases, plaintiffs often bring parallel state and federal trade-secret-misappropriation claims. See 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (providing that DTSA “shall not be construed to preempt or displace” state remedies).

Under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), a plaintiff must prove that the claimed trade secret has “sufficient particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those persons . . . skilled in the trade.” InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original).

The California Uniform Trade Secret Act (“CUTSA”), however, requries that a plaintiff “shall identify a trade secret with ‘reasonable particularity'” before discovery commences. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019.210.

In Quintara Biosciences Inc. v. Ruifeng Biztech Inc., No. 23-16093, __ F.4th __ (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2025), Quintara asserted a DTSA claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, but no CUTSA claims. The Northern District of California had ordered Quintara to disclose with “reasonable particularity” each of its allegedly misappropriated trade secrets at the outset of discovery, borrowing the California state law rule under CUTSA. The court later ruled that the Quintara had failed to meet CUTSA's section 2019.210's requirements, and struck nine of eleven trade secrets from its trade-secret disclosure, which effectively dismissed those trade-secret claims from the case. 

DTSA requires a plaintiff to identify a trade secret with “sufficient particularity” as a matter of fact, unlike CUTSA's “reasonable particularity” rule. InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 659. And unlike CUTSA, DTSA does not set out requirements for the specific timing or scope for identifying trade secrets. Instead, the conventional procedures under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Here, Ruifeng cited Rule 12(f) and the district court cited Rule 16 in managing the “delicate problem” of trade-secret discovery. But in moving to strike and striking Quintara's trade secrets, Ruifeng and the court ultimately relied on a California rule that does not control a federal trade-secret claim. And based on the facts and procedural posture of this case, neither Rule 12(f) nor Rule 16 authorized the district court to strike—and functionally dismiss—Quintara's claim to nine of its trade secrets.

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the order striking Quintara's trade secrets was an abuse of discretion.