Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, foreign words used as a trademark are translated into English and then tested for descriptiveness, geographic descriptiveness and mis-descriptiveness, genericness, and likelihood of confusion. In re Vetements Grp. AG, 137 F.4th 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1485 (2026) (citation omitted). The doctrine of foreign equivalents “is not an absolute rule and should be viewed merely as a guideline.” Id. (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). A “threshold limitation on the application of the doctrine of foreign equivalents” is whether it is likely that the ordinary American purchaser would "stop and translate" the word into its English equivalent. Id. at 1324-25; In re Spirits Int'l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Thus, “words from modern languages are generally translated into English,” such that “unless it is unlikely that the ordinary American purchaser would stop and translate the word into its English equivalent, the doctrine of foreign equivalents applies.” Vetements, 137 F.4th at 1326 (citations omitted).

When considering whether a foreign word would be translated by an ordinary American purchaser, “the burden is on the party opposing translation to show that it is unlikely the ordinary American purchaser would stop and translate the word into its English equivalent.” Vetements, 137 F.4th at 1331. And, if an appreciable number of Americans from the U.S. population as a whole are capable of translating the mark, the Board may find it likely will be translated. Id. 

Then again, when only one of the two words is foreign, a “translation of only part of the mark” often is found to be unlikely. See In re Universal Package Corp., 1984 TTAB LEXIS 136, at *9-*10 (finding the mark LE CASE for jewelry boxes created a different impression from “the case”). 

Also, if the word is commonly known in English, there is generally no need to translate it. TMEP § 809.01(b)(i) (“It is generally unnecessary to provide a translation of a foreign term if the term appears in an English dictionary (e.g., croissant, fiesta or flambé).”). This is sometimes referred to as a loanword that is at least partly assimilated from one language (the donor language) into another language (the recipient or target language).  

In the appeal of a refusal of the trademark application for HIBOU BLANC (which translates from French as "white owl") under Section 2(d) for likelihood of confusion with registered THE WHITE OWL CANDLE COMPANY mark, the Applicant argued that HIBOU “is not a common English loanword, is absent from standard English usage, and is unlikely to be recognized or translated by ordinary purchasers” and, as a result, “consumers will perceive HIBOU BLANC as a foreign-language brand name, not as the literal equivalent of ‘white owl.'” In re Leo G Bressette, Ser. No. 99020217 (TTAB Oct. 28. 2026). The Board noted that the threshold inquiry is not whether the non-English wording is common or present in English as a “loanword,” but rather whether an ordinary American purchaser would stop and translate it. 

Applicant's reliance on the Palm Bay case also was unsuccessful. The Board distinguished that Federal Circuit decision to decline translating VEUVE ROYALE in considering likelihood of confusion with the opposer's mark THE WIDOW because “it [was] improbable that the average American purchaser would stop and translate ‘VEUVE' into ‘widow.'” Id., 396 F.3d at 1377. The Board, however, did not explain the basis for the Federal Circuit's finding, which was that, in also refusing VEUVE ROYALE in view of VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN and VEUVE CLICQUOT, the Board also had found that “an appreciable number of purchasers are unlikely to be aware that VEUVE means ‘widow' and are unlikely to translate the marks into English.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision that a likelihood of confusion exists between applicant's VEUVE ROYALE mark and opposer's marks VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN and VEUVE CLICQUOT; but reversed the Board's conclusion of the likelihood of confusion as to the THE WIDOW mark. Here, there was no alternative grounds of refusal that was inconsistent with the application of the doctrine of foreign equivalents. In finding this case distinguishable from Palm Bay, the Board found that an appreciable number of Americans are capable of translating the wording HIBOU BLANC into WHITE OWL in English. 

The Board also distinguished In re Tia Maria, Inc., 1975 TTAB LEXIS 130, at *3-4, which had held that consumers would not translate TIA MARIA to “Aunt Mary” for restaurant services because a person dining at the TIA MARIA restaurant surrounded by its Mexican décor and Mexican food would be likely to accept the Spanish-language mark “TIA MARIA” as is and not translate it.

The Board held that "[t]here is no evidence that this mark is so unusual for the goods that it would not be translated," citing Vetements, 137 F.4th at 1327 (distinguishing Palm Bay because “vetements” “is a simple and common word—the word for clothing” as opposed to “veuve,” the word for “widow,” which “requires a more advanced vocabulary”).

Separately, Wikipedia states that owls with visible ear tufts are known as "Hibou". Indeed, during prosecution, Applicant provided definitions ostensibly from French dictionaries and Internet sources indicating that in French “‘hibou' does not simply mean ‘owl'—it means ‘horned owl'”'—but Applicant did not attach copies or printouts from any of these sources and thus failed to make them of record. In any event, the Board noted that Applicant did not mention any such evidence of this alternative meaning in his pro se appeal brief. In addition, the TTABlog suggested that the appeal brief appeared to be AI-created with "16 pages of argument that was largely off-base."